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  At	   the	   outset	   of	   the	   Arab	   Uprising,	   President	   Bashar	   al-­‐Asad	   famously	   declared	   that	  Syria	   was	   different	   because	   the	   leadership	   and	   people	   shared	   the	   same	   values—stability	  and	  nationalist	  steadfastness-­‐-­‐which	  his	  regime	  had	  delivered-­‐-­‐and	  hence	  that	  the	  Arab	   spring	  would	   not	   spread	   to	   his	   country.	  He	  was,	   of	   course,	  wrong,	   but	   over	  three	  years	  after	  the	  outbreak,	  Asad’s	  regime	  constitutes	  the	  domino	  left	  standing.	  	  	   What	   explains	   the	   unique	   tangent	   in	   the	   Arab	   Uprising	   in	   Syria,	   namely	   one	  where	  Uprising	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  overthrow	  of	  a	  president,	  either	  through	  peaceful	  protest	  (Tunisia,	   Egypt),	   or	   civil	   war	   (Libya)	   or	   some	  middle	   path	   (Yemen),	   but	   rather	   after	  three	   years	   of	   civil	   conflict,	   president	   and	   regime	   remain	   standing,	   but	   the	   state	   has	  failed?	  	  	  
Toward	  understanding	  the	  Syrian	  tangent:	  between	  structure	  and	  agency	  Several	  key	  concepts	  or	  issues	  are	  needed	  to	  grasp	  the	  Syrian	  tangent:	  	  	   1)	  We	  can	  see	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  regime	  to	  the	  Uprising	  by	  examination	  of	  its	  structural	  roots—the	   flawed	  states	  system,	  particular	  state	  building	   formulas,	  and	  the	  movement	  under	  global	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  to	  “post-­‐populism.”	  While	  this	  paper	  will	  briefly	  examine	  this,	   it	  has	  been	  amply	  covered	  elsewhere1	  and	  will	  here	  be	  treated	  chiefly	  as	  the	  context	  for	  understanding	  the	  Syrian	  tangent.	  	  	   2)	  The	  paper	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  tangent	  is	  best	  seen	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  agency,	  with	  the	  choices	  of	  actors—regime	  and	  opposition—generating	  a	  path	  dependency	  that	  locked	   both	   into	   unwanted	   and	   unexpected	   outcomes.	   To	   understand	   the	   particular	  tangent	   the	  uprising	   took,	  we	  need	   to	   look	  at	   three	   issues	  of	   agency:	   a)	   the	   failure	  of	  mass	  non-­‐violent	  protest	  to	  lead	  to	  democratic	  transition;	  b)	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  opposition	  and	  unexpected	  regime	  resilience;	  c)	  the	  descent	  into	  the	  “security	  dilemma“	  and	  d)	  an	  eternally-­‐driven	  “war	  economy.”	  	  
Theoretical	  perspectives:	  flaws	  of	  the	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  paradigm	  According	   to	   the	   mass	   non-­‐violent	   protest	   paradigm,	   mass	   protest	   can	   rapidly	   and	  effectively	  destabilize	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  The	  work	  of	  Stephan	  and	  Chenoweth2	  not	  only	   describes	   the	   dynamics	   of	   mass	   protest,	   but	   also	   has	   evidently	   inspired	   Arab	  protestors.	  They	  argue	  that	  mass	  protest	  can	  readily	  destabilize	  authoritarian	  regimes;	  
even	  if	   the	  regime	  refuses	  protestors’	  demands	  and	  uses	  violence	  against	   them,	   this	   is	  likely	   to	   backfire,	   stimulating	   wider	   anti-­‐regime	   mobilization,	   precipitating	  international	  sanctions	  and	  support	  for	  the	  opposition,	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  causing	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defections	  in	  the	  security	  forces,	  which	  will	  be	  reluctant	  to	  use	  violence	  against	  fellow	  citizens	  who	  are	  not	  themselves	  using	  violence.	  	  
	   The	   problem	  with	   this	   literature	   it	   that	   it	   leaves	   little	   agency	   to	   ruling	   elites,	  when,	  in	  fact,	  how	  they	  respond	  to	  mass	  protest	  makes	  all	  the	  difference	  for	  outcomes-­‐-­‐which	  can	  range	  from	  peaceful	  democratization	  to	  regime	  collapse	  to	  civil	  war.	  The	  best	  chance	   for	   peaceful	   democratization	   is,	   as	   the	   transition	   paradigm	   argues,	   a	   pact	  wherein	  the	  opposition	  refrains	  from	  threatening	  the	  vital	  interests	  of	  incumbents	  who,	  in	  return,	  concede	  a	  pluralisation	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  Such	  a	  scenario	  is	  more	  likely	  when	   non-­‐violent	   resistance	   encourages	   moderates	   within	   the	   regime	   to	   push	   for	  reform	  and	  withdraw	  their	  support	  from	  hard-­‐line	  authoritarians	  and	  less	  likely	  when	  rebels	  make	  maximalist	  demands	  or	  resort	  to	  violence,	  thereby	  empowering	  hardliners	  against	  the	  moderates.3	  The	  former	  scenario	  arguably	  held	  in	  the	  Egyptian	  and	  Tunisian	  cases,	  the	  latter	  in	  Syria	  or	  Libya.	  In	  Syria,	  from	  this	  “original	  sin,”	  in	  which	  both	  sides	  were	  complicit,	  a	  downward	  spiral	  toward	  a	  failed	  state	  and	  civil	  war	  resulted.	  	  	   What	   the	   non-­‐violent	   protest	   paradigm	   also	   fails	   to	   anticipate	   is	   the	  consequences	   when	   protest	   destabilizes	   the	   state	   but	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   democratic	  transition.	   The	   outcome	  may	   well	   be	   a	   failed	   state,	   a	   Hobbesian	   world	   in	   which	   life	  becomes	  “nasty,	  shortish	  and	  brute.”	  Also,	  it	  does	  not	  appreciate	  that	  such	  a	  breakdown	  in	  order	  may	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  reverse.	  Even	  though	  a	  “hurting	  stalemate”	  ought,	  at	  a	  certain	  point,	  to	  lead	  actors	  to	  realize	  neither	  can	  defeat	  the	  other,	  and	  hence	  to	  seek	  a	  compromise	   political	   settlement,	   what	   is	   equally	   possible	   is	   what	   happened	   in	   the	  Syrian	  case—each	  hoped	  to	  win	  by	  further	  escalating	  the	  level	  of	  violence,	  encouraged	  by	  external	  backers.	  This	  takes	  on	  an	  autonomous	  logic	  outside	  of	  the	  control	  of	  leaders,	  for	  once	  the	  state	   fails	  and	  order	  breaks	  down,	  the	  “security	  dilemma”4	  kicks	   in:	  as	  all	  groups,	  fearing	  the	  other,	  fall	  back	  on	  group	  solidarity	  for	  protection	  and	  seek	  their	  own	  security	  through	  what	  they	  see	  as	  self-­‐protective	  violence,	  insecurity	  actually	  increases	  for	   all,	   making	   for	   an	   unstoppable	   spiral	   of	   violence.	   But	   additionally,	   as	   the	   normal	  economy	   collapses,	   a	   “war	   economy”	   in	  which	   people	   deprived	   of	   a	   normal	   life	   seek	  survival	  through	  spoils	  and	  flock	  to	  those	  groups	  with	  access	  to	  largely	  external	  funding,	  civil	  war	  persists	  despite	  the	  damage	  it	  inflicts	  on	  all	  sides.	  	  	  
Structure:	  The	  roots	  of	  the	  Uprising	  The	  origins	  of	   the	   current	   crisis	   can	  ultimately	  be	   traced	   to	  a	   failure	  of	   state	  building	  resulting	  from	  the	  post-­‐WWI	  imposition	  of	  the	  states	  system	  in	  the	  region	  by	  Western	  imperialism	   in	   what	   David	   Fromkin5	  called	   a	   “peace	   to	   end	   all	   peace.”	   Levant	   states,	  which	   had	   been	   artificially	   created	   by	   imperialism	   in	   violation	   of	   the	   dominant	  identities	   of	   the	   region’s	   peoples	   had	   to	   compete	  with	   powerful	   sub-­‐	   and	   supra-­‐state	  forces	   for	   the	   loyalties	   of	   their	   populations,	   and	   hence	   suffered	   built-­‐in	   legitimacy	  deficits	  which	  made	  them	  perhaps	  set	  up	  to	  fail.	  	  	   In	   these	   circumstances,	   Arab	   state	   builders	   gravitated	   toward	   neo-­‐patrimonial	  practices	   that	   combined	   time-­‐honoured	   indigenous	   state-­‐building	   formulas	   (Ibn	  Khaldun’s	   assabiya that	   is,	   elite	   solidarity	   built	   on	   primordial	   ties)	   with	   modern	  
                                                
3 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Part 4 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986. 4	  Barry	  Posen,	  ‘The	  Security	  Dilemma	  and	  Ethnic	  Conflict’,	  Survival,	  35,	  no.	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  (Spring	  1993).	  
5 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace; the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the 
Modern Middle East, New York: Avon Books, 1989. 
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bureaucratic	   machinery	   and	   surveillance	   technology.	   This	   formula	   was	   empowered,	  perhaps	   beyond	   its	   shelf	   life,	   by	   the	   exceptional	   availability	   of	   hydrocarbon	   and	  geopolitical	   rent	   in	   the	   region,	   which	   enabled	   the	   lubrication	   of	   clientele	   networks	  supportive	   of	   patrimonial	   rule	   and	   also	   enabled	   a	   populist	   “social	   contract”	  with	   the	  masses.	  	  	   Ba’thist	   populist	   authoritarianism	   in	   Syria	   was	   no	   exception.	   	   Hafiz	   al-­‐Asad	  established	   a	   regime	   based	   on	   the	   assabiya	   of	   the	   Alawi	   elite	   that	   he	   appointed	   to	  strategic	  commands	  of	  the	  military-­‐security	  apparatuses;	  this	  was	  combined	  with	  rent-­‐fuelled	   clientalism	   and	   the	   mass	   incorporation	   through	   the	   Ba’th	   party	   of	   the	   state-­‐employed	  middle	  class	  and	  (both	  Sunni	  and	  non-­‐Sunni)	  peasantry	  (via	  land	  reform);	  the	  regime	  was	  legitimized	  by	  Arab	  nationalist	  ideology	  and	  defended	  by	  the	  repression	  of	  persistent	  (mostly	  Islamic)	  opposition.	  While	  this	  ended	  Syria’s	  endemic	  instability	  and	  consolidated	  forty	  years	  of	  Ba’thist	  rule,	  each	  ingredient	  of	  Asad’s	  state	  building	  recipe	  had	   its	   costs:	   sectarian	  assabiya	   alienated	   out-­‐groups;	   rent	  was	   finite;	   repression	   left	  many	   politically	   unincorporated	   and	   legitimation	   from	   Arab	   nationalism	   embroiled	  Syria	   in	   costly	   regional	   conflicts	   and	   generated	   Western	   hostility—particularly	  dangerous	   after	   Asad	   lost	   his	   Cold	   war	   era	   Soviet	   patron.	   And,	   relying	   on	   sub-­‐state	  (Alawi)	   and	   supra-­‐state	   loyalties	   (Arabism)	   to	   an	   extent	   deterred	   consolidation	   of	  identifications	  with	  the	  Syrian	  state.	  	  	  	   Across	   the	   region,	   a	   combination	  of	   rent	   decline	   and	  population	  boom	  created	  economic	  crises	  that	  put	  extreme	  pressures	  on	  the	  authoritarian	  republics	  –	  especially	  under	   the	   influence	   of	   global	   neo-­‐liberalism	   –	   to	  move	   toward	  what	  might	   be	   called	  “post-­‐populism”	   in	  which,	  as	   in	  Syria	  under	  Bashar	  al-­‐Asad,	   the	  state	  withdraws	   from	  welfare	   provision	   and	   favours	   investors,	   creating	   a	   new	   crony	   capitalism	   and	  exacerbating	  social	   inequality.	  This	  generated	  the	  cocktail	  of	  grievances	   that	  exploded	  in	  the	  Arab	  Uprisings.	  	  	   In	  parallel,	  even	  as	  the	  global	  convergence	  of	  LDCs	  toward	  a	  homogeneous	  neo-­‐liberalism	   was	   depriving	   them	   of	   their	   capacity	   to	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   their	   growing	  populations—and	   in	  MENA	   forcing	   them	   to	   renege	   on	   the	   populist	   “social	   contract”-­‐-­‐	  globalization	   was	   also	   accompanied	   by	   a	   diffusion	   of	   new	   media	   and	   internet	  technology,	   and	   with	   it,	   West-­‐centric	   democratization	   discourses	   that	   helped	   to	  delegitimize	   the	   post-­‐populist	   ruling	   formulas	   of	   regimes	   like	   Bashar	   al-­‐Asad’s	   Syria.	  The	  street	  protest	   that	  has	  become	   increasingly	  endemic	   in	   the	  non-­‐Western	  world	   is	  encouraged	  by	  both	  Western	  NGO	  funding	  and	  democratization	  discourses.	  	   The	  younger	  Asad’s	  post-­‐populist	  economic	  policies	  sowed	  the	  seeds	  of	  rebellion	  and	  made	   his	   regime	   vulnerable	   to	  mobilization	   of	   discontent;	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  regime’s	   reforms	   debilitated	   its	   own	   institutional	   base,	  making	   it	   vulnerable	   to	  what	  ultimately	   became	   an	   Sunni	   Islamist	   led	   revolt.	   There	   had	   been	   similar	   grievances	  among	  Sunnis	   in	   the	  early	  1980s,	  but	   the	   rebellion	   then	  was	  much	  more	   localized,	   so	  what	   had	   changed?	   Then,	  many	   Sunni	   villages,	   still	   incorporated	   into	   the	   Ba’th	   party	  and	   its	   peasant	   union,	   sided	   with	   the	   regime	   against	   the	   urban-­‐based	   Muslim	  Brotherhood;	  however,	   in	  the	  2000s,	  the	  party/peasant	  union	  infrastructure	  and	  rural	  services	   had	   been	   debilitated	   and	   agriculture	   neglected	   and	   devastated	   by	   years	   of	  drought.	   Population	   growth	   on	   fixed	   land	   resources	   had	   left	   peasant	   youth,	   whose	  fathers	  had	  been	  part	  of	  regime	  base,	  landless,	  dependent	  on	  entering	  a	  depressed	  non-­‐agricultural	   job	   market,	   and	   “available”	   for	   anti-­‐regime	   mobilization.	   Regime	  connections	   to	   the	   mass	   public,	   whether	   the	   ruling	   party	   or	   corporatist	   structures	  (trade	   unions,	   peasant	   unions),	   had	   withered	   in	   a	   way	   similar	   to	   the	   case	   in	   other	  Uprising	  states.	  But	  this	  was	  especially	  dangerous	  in	  Syria	  if	  one	  considers	  how	  crucial	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this	   political	   infrastructure	   was	   to	   allowing	   a	   minority-­‐dominated	   Ba’th	   regime	   to	  consolidate	  a	  cross-­‐sectarian	  power	  base	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
Agency:	   stumbling	   on	   the	   way	   to	   democratization-­‐-­‐from	   mass	   protest	   to	   the	  
security	  dilemma	  
The	  Failure	  of	  Democratic	  Transition	  As	  Bassam	  Haddad	  had	  anticipated,6	  the	  one	  thing	  that	  could	  spread	  the	  Arab	  Uprising	  to	  Syria	  was	  an	  over-­‐reaction	  by	  the	  security	   forces.	   In	  a	  17	  February	  2011	  protest	   in	  the	  Old	  City	  of	  Damascus	  the	  Interior	  Minister	  had	  exemplified	  how	  protests	  ought	  to	  be	  handled:	   he	   arrived	   personally,	   placated	   the	   protestors	   and	   disciplined	   a	   policeman	  whose	  behaviour	  had	  sparked	  the	  protest.	  The	  protests	  did	  not	  spread,	  despite	  Syrian	  expatriates	   earlier	   5	   February	   invocation	   of	   a	   “Day	   of	   Rage”	   against	   the	   regime.	   By	  contrast,	   in	   Dera,	   formerly	   a	   stronghold	   of	   the	   Ba’th	   party,	   a	   March	   confrontation	  between	   protestors	   and	   heavy-­‐handed	   security	   forces	   escalated	   out	   of	   control;	  resistance	  quickly	  spread	  via	   tribal	  networks	  and	  sparked	  sympathy	  protests	   in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  which	  started	  a	  spiral	  of	  revolt	  that	  the	  regime	  would	  never	  be	  able	  to	  bring	  fully	  under	  control.	  	  	   In	   the	  early	  days	  of	   the	  crisis,	  however,	  effective	   leadership	   from	  the	  president	  could	   still	   have	   made	   a	   difference,	   particularly	   had	   Asad	   reacted	   with	   democratic	  concessions	   instead	   of	   repression.	   Had	   Bashar	   chosen	   to	   lead	   the	   reform	   process,	   he	  might	  have	  actually	  won	  a	  free	  election	  to	  another	  presidential	  term.	  Unfortunately,	  his	  March	   30,	   2011	   speech	   at	   the	   beginnings	   of	   the	   protests,	   in	   which	   he	   deprecated	  popular	  grievances,	  disillusioned	  the	  many	  who	  wanted	  him	  to	  use	  the	  crisis	  to	  advance	  reform.	  	  	   There	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   “soft-­‐liners”	   in	   the	   regime,	   such	   as	   Vice	   president,	  Farouk	  al-­‐Sharaa,	  who,	  originating	   from	  Dera,	  was	  distressed	  at	   the	  use	  of	   force	  there	  and	  Bouthina	  Shabaan,	  whose	  public	  discourse	  seemed	  to	  promise	  substantial	  reforms.	  In	  reaction	  to	  Dera	  there	  were	  hundreds	  of	  resignations	  from	  the	  Ba’th	  party	  and	  there	  were	   later	   to	   be	   defections	   among	   top	   elites	  who	   also	  presumably	  would	  have	  urged	  compromise	   with	   the	   protestors.	   However,	   in	   the	   event,	   it	   appears	   that	   either	   the	  president	  was	  a	  captive	  of	  the	  hardliners	  or	  they	  convinced	  him	  that	  the	  Uprising	  could	  be	   quickly	   squashed	   if	   substantive	   force	  were	   used;	  what	   the	   Egyptian	   and	   Tunisian	  regimes	  had	  done	  wrong,	  security	  chiefs	  reputedly	  told	  Bashar,	  was	  to	  hesitate	  in	  their	  use	  of	  repression.	  	  	   One	   explanation	   for	   his	   failure	   to	   better	   manage	   the	   crisis	   could	   be	   that,	  preoccupied	  with	  foreign	  policy	  and	  having	  become	  complacent	  owing	  to	  his	  success	  in	  surviving	   threats	   from	   the	   US	   and	   reversing	   isolation	   from	   Europe,	   he	   neglected	   the	  domestic	  vulnerabilities	  of	  his	  regime.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  reliable	  command	  post	   of	   the	   Syrian	   state	   had	   always	   been	   the	  mukhabarat	   and	   hence	   regime	   leaders’	  natural	   fallback	   position	   when	   challenged	   was	   to	   turn	   to	   the	   levers	   of	   repression.	  Further,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  the	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite,	  ‘having	  inherited	  power	  rather	  than	  fought	  for	  it,	  grown	  up	  in	  Damascus,	  mingled	  with	   and	  mimicked	   the	  ways	   of	   the	   urban	   upper	   class’	   had	   lost	   touch	  with	   its	   social	  
                                                
6  Bassam Haddad, (2011)	   Why	   Syria	   Is	   Unlikely	   to	   be	   Next	   .	   .	   .	   for	   Now,	   “	   Sada,	   March	   9,	  http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/09/why-­‐syria-­‐is-­‐unlikely-­‐to-­‐be-­‐next-­‐.-­‐.-­‐.-­‐for-­‐now/6bhl	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roots.7	  	   Also,	   given	   the	  minority	   core	   of	   the	   regime,	   it	  may	   be	   Asad	   simply	   could	   not	  afford	  to	  make	  sufficient	  democratic	  concessions,	  especially	  after	  the	  debilitation	  of	  the	  regime’s	   former	   cross-­‐sectarian	   base	   would	   have	   made	   success	   in	   elections	  problematic.	  In	  addition,	  his	  rule	  had	  started	  to	  be	  more	  of	  a	  family	  regime,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	   the	   clan	   could	   well	   have	   been	   losers	   under	   democratization,	   especially	   the	   highly	  unpopular	   tycoon	   Rami	   Makhlouf	   and	   Maher	   al-­‐Asad	   whose	   violent	   overreaction	  reflected	  the	  tribal	  mentality	  and	  minority	  complex	  of	  some	  Alawis	  in	  the	  regime.	  In	  the	  event,	  Asad	  chose	  to	  stand	  with	  the	  hardliners.	  	   If	  non-­‐violent	  protest	  was	  going	  to	  precipitate	  a	   transition,	  a	  coalition	  between	  soft-­‐liners	  in	  the	  regime	  and	  in	  the	  opposition	  combining	  to	  marginalize	  the	  hardliners	  was	  needed,	  but	  in	  the	  Syrian	  case,	  the	  soft-­‐liners	  were	  marginalized	  on	  both	  sides	  by	  the	  regime’s	  use	  of	  violence	  but	  also	  by	  the	  maximalist	  demands—fall	  of	  the	  regime-­‐-­‐of	  the	  opposition.	  Asad	  blamed	  the	  uprising	  on	  external	  troublemakers	  and	  terrorists	  and	  while	   these	   claims	   are	   usually	   dismissed	   in	   the	  West	   and	   were	   grossly	   exaggerated,	  there	   is	   a	  modicum	   of	   substance	   in	   them.	   Determined	   activists,	  many	   of	   them	   exiles,	  systematically	   set	   out	   to	   spread	   the	   Arab	   uprising	   to	   Syria,	   using	   the	   Internet	   and	  promoting	  a	  discourse	  of	  democratization	  meant	   to	  de-­‐legitimize	   the	   regime.	   In	   some	  instances,	  the	  regime	  was	  deliberately	  provoked,	  when,	  for	  example,	  in	  sectarian-­‐mixed	  Banias	   an	   uncompromising	   salafi	   shaykh	   exploited	   years	   of	   anti-­‐Alawite	   resentment	  among	   Sunnis.	   In	   some	   places	   party	   headquarters	   or	   the	   officers	   club	  were	   attacked,	  statues	  of	  Hafiz	  al-­‐Asad	  and	  portraits	  of	  his	  son	  were	  torn	  down,	  and,	  much	  earlier	  than	  is	   usually	   acknowledged,	   there	   were	   armed	   attacks	   on	   the	   regime’s	   security	   forces.8	  How	  the	  regime	  responded	  to	  the	  protests	  (and	  provocations)	  made	  all	   the	  difference	  for	  the	  Syrian	  tangent;	  it	  did	  not	  have	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  apparent	  trap	  set	  by	  its	  opponents	  —	  but	  it	  did	  so	  in	  its	  precipitate	  resort	  to	  disproportionate	  repression.	  	  	   But	   equally,	   as	   several	   analysts	   argued,	   the	   mistake	   of	   the	   Syrian	   protest	  movement	   was	   its	   “rush	   to	   confrontation”	   with	   the	   regime	   while	   it	   still	   retained	  significant	   support. 9 	  Even	   though	   the	   regime	   conceded	   many	   reforms	   that	   the	  opposition	  had	  been	  demanding	  for	  decades	  and	  proposed	  dialogue,	  those	  committed	  to	  its	  removal	  had	  to	  dismiss	  them	  as	  inadequate	  and	  insincere.	  Besides	  the	  moral	  outrage	  at	   the	  killings	  perpetuated	  by	   the	   government,	   opposition	   activists	   believed	   that	   they	  could	  only	  be	   safe	   if	   the	   regime	  was	   totally	  destroyed	   since	   if	   it	   survived	   it	  would	  be	  certain	  to	  seek	  retribution.	  	   However,	  with	  the	  hardline	  opposition	  insisting	  on	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  regime,	  and	  its	  resort	  to	  periodic	  violence,	  the	  soft-­‐liners	  in	  the	  regime	  were	  unlikely	  to	  marginalize	  the	  hardliners.	  Senior	  soft-­‐liners,	  who	  spoke	  the	  language	  of	  reconciliation,	  seemed	  too	  far	  from	   the	   immediate	   levers	   of	   command	   that	  were	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   hardliners	   such	   as	  Maher	   al-­‐Asad.10	  Similarly,	   internal	   third	  parties	  who	   tried	   to	  mediate	  were	   squeezed	  out,	   notably	   the	   traditional	   opposition	   organized	   in	   the	   National	   Coordination	  Committee	   (NCC)	   whose	   members	   were	   much	   more	   experienced	   than	   the	   younger	  
                                                7	  International Crisis Group, ‘The Syrian People’s Slow Motion Revolution,’ Brussels and Damascus, 6 July 
2011. 
8New	  York	  Times,	  “The	  Price	  of	  Loyalty	  in	  Syria,”	  by	  Robert	  Worth,	  June	  19,	  2013.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/23/magazine/the-­‐price-­‐of-­‐loyalty-­‐in-­‐syria.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=2&pagewanted=all&	  9	  Maged	  Mandour,	  ‘Beyond	  Civil	  Resistance:	  The	  Case	  of	  Syria’,	  openDemocracy,	  26	  Oct.	  2013,	  www.opendemocracy.net/arab-­‐awakening/maged-­‐mandour/beyond-­‐civil-­‐resistance-­‐case-­‐of-­‐syria.	  10	  Peter	  Harling,	  ‘Syria’s	  Race	  against	  the	  Clock’,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  11	  Apr.	  2011,	  http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/11/syrias_race_against_the_clock	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demonstrators.	   At	   the	   famous	   Samiramis	   conference	   in	   June	   2013	   they	   put	   forth	   a	  compromise	  proposal	  but	  both	  regime	  and	  opposition	  rejected	  it.	  	  	   Why	  did	  a	  negotiated	  transition	   fail?	  The	  spilling	  of	  blood	  happened	  so	  quickly	  on	   such	   a	   significant	   scale	   that	   compromise	   was	   soon	   rejected	   on	   both	   sides.	   With	  regime	   concessions,	   too	   little	   too	   late,	   the	  opposition	   escalated	   its	   resistance	   via	   ever	  larger	   mass	   demonstrations	   which	   in	   turn	   provoked	   violent	   and	   repressive	   counter-­‐escalation	   by	   the	   regime.	  Henceforth	   also	   the	   opposition	   lacked	   credible	   leaders	  who	  could	   deliver	   its	   consent	   to	   a	   negotiated	   settlement	   should	   that	   have	   appeared	   in	   its	  interest.	  	  	   In	   summary,	   an	   Egyptian	   or	   Tunisian	   scenario	   of	   relatively	   peaceful	   transition	  toward	  democratization	  would	  have	  required	  that,	  in	  parallel,	  soft-­‐liners	  in	  the	  regime	  and	  the	  opposition	  marginalize	  the	  hardliners	  on	  both	  sides	  and	  reach	  a	  deal	  on	  power-­‐sharing	   and	   transition.	   Instead,	   on	   both	   sides,	   the	   hardliners	   marginalized	   the	   soft-­‐liners.	  	  	   	  	  
Regime	  resilience	  in	  the	  face	  of	  mass	  protest	  The	   Syrian	   Uprising	   took	   particular	   forms,	   both	   similar	   and	   different	   from	   those	   in	  other	   Uprising	   states.	   Among	   the	   similarities	   was	   the	   key	   role	   assumed	   by	   youth	  activists.	  Events	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  spread	  the	  idea	  that	  popular	  protests	  could	  indeed	  succeed	   in	   overthrowing	   authoritarian	   rulers	   and	   broke	   the	   “fear	   barrier”	   in	   Syria,	  creating	  an	  illusion	  of	  empowerment	  especially	  among	  youth.	  Diaspora	  activists	  played	  a	   pivotal	   role,	   using	   the	   Internet	   and	   new	  media,	   in	   encouraging	   revolt.	  Mobilization	  took	  place	  on	  two	  levels:	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  coordinating	  committees	  planned	  day	  to	  day	  protests	  while	   cyber	   activists	   used	   the	   internet	   to	   share	   information,	   coordinate	   and	  publicize	  their	  protests,	  keep	  the	  momentum	  going	  and	  convey	  a	  sense	  of	  national-­‐level	  solidarity.11	  As	  in	  other	  cases,	  also,	  protestors	  were	  able	  to	  mount	  sustained	  large-­‐scale	  demonstrations	  that	  put	  the	  regime	  very	  much	  on	  the	  defensive.	  	  	   The	  main	   difference,	   however,	   from	   Egypt	   and	   Tunisia	   where	   a	   similar	   spiral	  took	  hold,	  was	  that	  the	  president	  was	  not	  quickly	  overthrown	  in	  a	  relatively	  brief	  and	  sharp	  burst	  of	   revolt	  quickly	  converging	  on	   the	  centre	  of	  power.	  Different	   from	  Egypt	  but	   somewhat	   similar	   to	   Libya,	   the	   uprising	   was	   geographically	   dispersed	   and	   away	  from	   the	   capital,	   beginning	   in	   the	   rural	   peripheries,	   then	   spreading	   to	   small	   towns,	  suburbs,	   and	   medium	   sized	   cities,	   where	   its	   foot	   soldiers	   were	   unemployed	   youth,	  refugees	  from	  drought	  and	  others	  among	  the	  “losers”	  of	  a	  decade	  of	  post-­‐populist	  neo-­‐liberalism.	  For	  a	  considerable	  period,	  protest	  was	  contained	  in	  the	  periphery	  while	  the	  centers	   of	   power	   (Damascus)	   and	   business	   (Aleppo)	   stayed	   relatively	   immune.	   This	  corresponded	   precisely	   to	   the	   geographical	   distribution	   of	   benefits	   and	   costs	   of	  Bashar’s	  post-­‐populist	  upgrading.	  	   	  Different	  from	  other	  cases,	  also,	  was	  that	  the	  uprising	  had	  from	  the	  beginning	  a	  sectarian	   dimension,	   inevitable	   given	   the	   Alawi	   dominance	   of	   the	   regime	   and	   the	  concentration	   of	   the	   Uprising	   among	   the	   majority	   Sunnis.	   The	   main	   occasion	   for	  mobilization	   became	   Friday	   prayers,	   with	   imams	   natural	   leaders	   of	   their	  neighbourhoods	  and,	  outwith	  the	  main	  cities,	  mostly	  anti-­‐regime.	  Saudi-­‐financed	  salafi	  and	   Muslim	   Brotherhood	   connected	   elements	   actively	   mobilized	   protestors.	   Initial	  centres	   of	   grievances	  were	  mixed	   areas	  where	   Alawis	   and	   Sunni	   lived	   together	   as	   in	  Latakia,	   Banias	   and	   Homs.	   The	   uprising	   then	   spread	   to	   Hama	   and	   Deir	   az-­‐Zur,	  traditional	  bastions	  of	  Sunni	  piety	  resentful	  of	  the	  regime.	  Tribes	  also	  played	  a	  role;	  the	  
                                                11	  Kim	  Ghattas,	  ‘Syria’s	  spontaneously	  organised	  protests’,	  BBC	  News,	  22	  Apr.	  2011,	  www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐middle-­‐east-­‐13168276	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decline	  of	  the	  security	  forces’	  control	  of	  them	  thorough	  subsidies	  and	  exemptions	  and	  its	  replacement	  by	  Saudi	  money	  was	  important	  in	  the	  regime’s	  loss	  of	  control	  over	  the	  tribal	  periphery.	  	  	   	  Given	  this	  character	  of	   the	  opposition—pious	   lower	  class,	  rural	  and	  Sunni-­‐-­‐the	  social	   base	   on	   which	   the	   regime	   relied	   to	   survive	   had	   many	   of	   the	   opposite	  characteristics	   and	   was	   the	   product	   of	   a	   decade	   of	   “authoritarian	   upgrading.”	   It	  comprised	   the	   crony	   capitalists,	   urban	   government	   employees	   and	   the	   minorities,	  especially	   Alawis	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   degree	   Christians	   who,	   not	   suffering	   from	   the	  restrictions	  on	  public	  religiosity	  and	  church	  building	  typical	  elsewhere,	  were	  rallied	  by	  exploiting	   their	   fear	  of	   salafi	   Islam.	  The	  main	   cities,	  Damascus	  and	  Aleppo,	  where	   the	  investment	  boom,	  the	  take-­‐off	  of	  tourism	  and	  the	  new	  consumption	  were	  concentrated,	  remained	  largely	  quiescent	  months	  into	  the	  uprising,	  although	  their	  poor	  suburbs	  were	  often	   hotbeds	   of	   revolt.	   The	   regime	   was	   able	   to	   mobilize	   significant	   counter-­‐demonstrations	   in	   these	   cities.	  The	  middle	   class	  of	   the	   two	  main	   cities	  originally	   saw	  Bashar	   as	   a	   reformer	   and	   while	   they	   were	   disillusioned	   by	   his	   repression	   of	   the	  protestors	  they	  preferred	  a	  peaceful	  democratization	  and	  feared	  instability	  and	  loss	  of	  their	  secular	  modern	  life	  style	  if	  traditional	  rural	  or	  salafi	  insurgents	  took	  power.	  Senior	  urban	  ulama,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  been	  co-­‐opted,	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  uprising	  to	  win	  new	  concessions	  from	  the	  regime	  rather	  than	  abandoning	  it.	  	  	   As	   with	   all	   post-­‐populist	   regimes,	   Bashar’s	   had	   started	   to	   forge	   an	   alignment	  with	   the	  business	  class,	  but	   such	   “authoritarian	  upgrading”	  had	  gone	  much	   less	   far	   in	  Syria	  than	  in	  Egypt	  or	  Tunisia	  and	  cooptation	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie	  on	  the	  regime	  side	  was	  not	  as	  thorough	  as	  in	  Egypt.	  Aggrandizement	  of	  the	  presidential	  family	  also	  weakened	  the	   regime’s	   potential	   class	   support	   for	   its	   neo-­‐liberal	   tangent.	   Indeed,	   exiled	  businessmen	  who	  had	  lost	  out	  to	  regime-­‐connected	  operators	  were	  big	   funders	  of	   the	  insurgency.	  Still,	  much	  of	  the	  in-­‐country	  business	  class	  saw	  no	  alternative	  to	  the	  regime	  and	  initially	  hoped	  it	  would	  end	  the	  disorder.	  	  	   A	   main	   difference	   from	   all	   other	   Uprising	   cases	   was	   that	   a	   major	   split	   in	   the	  regime	  or	  army	  did	  not	  happen.	  The	  opposition	  strategy	  depended	  on	  a	  level	  and	  scale	  of	  protests	  that	  the	  security	  services	  would	  be	  stretched	  thin	  and	  exhausted,	  perhaps	  so	  provoked	   they	  would	   increase	   violence	   that	  would	   turn	   a	  majority	   of	   the	   population	  against	  the	  regime,	  or	  split	  the	  regime	  internally	  and	  especially	  lead	  to	  such	  disaffection	  in	  the	  army	  that	  it	  would	  become	  an	  unreliable	  instrument	  of	  repression.	  	  	   However,	  the	  military,	  organized	  around	  its	  Alawi	  core	  and	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  presidential	  clan,	  but	  also	  long	  invested	  in	  the	  regime	  through	  the	  military	  branches	  of	  the	  Ba’th	  party,	  remained	  largely	  cohesive	  and	  loyal.	  It	  did	  not	  turn	  against	  its	  superiors	  and	  enough	   loyal	  units	  were	  willing	   to	   fire	  on	  demonstrators.	  The	  defections	   that	  did	  take	  place	  did	  not	  touch	  upon	  the	  core	  of	  the	  government’s	  power	  base	  until	  much	  later	  when	   non-­‐violence	   had	   become	  marginalized.	   Alawi	   dominated	   units,	   such	   as	   the	   4th	  division,	  headed	  by	  Maher	  al-­‐Asad,	  and	   the	  Republican	  Guard,	   seen	  as	   the	  most	   loyal,	  were	  most	  involved	  in	  repression.	  Alawis	  were	  also	  mobilized	  in	  militias	  (the	  shabiha),	  later	   organized	   into	   a	   formal	   national	   guard,	   and	   were	   recruited	   into	   the	   military	  reserves;	   with	  much	   to	   lose	   if	   the	   regime	   fell,	   they	   remained	   its	  most	   reliable	   shock	  troops.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  Syrian	  army	  generally	  became	  implicated	  in	  the	  repression—with	   protestors	   starting	   to	   denounce	   it—its	   stake	   in	   regime	   survival	   increased.	  Defections	  were	  of	  a	   lesser	   scale	  and	  amounted	   to	  attrition	  over	   time	  rather	   than	   the	  sudden	  major	   splits	  or	   collapse	  of	   the	  army	   in	  Yemen	  and	  Libya	  and	   contrasted	  even	  more	  sharply	  with	  the	  early	  refusal	  of	  the	  military	  top	  commands	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  to	  defend	  the	  President	  against	  protestors.	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   While	   al-­‐Asad’s	   regime’s	   increasing	   use	   of	   lethal	   force	   against	   non-­‐violent	  protestors	   did	   alienate	   wide	   swaths	   of	   the	   public,	   as	   the	   non-­‐violent	   resistance	  paradigm	   expects,	   because	   society	   rapidly	   became	   communally	   polarized,	   the	  opposition	  could	  be	  constructed,	  among	  the	  regime’s	  constituency,	  as	  the	  “other.”	  As	  for	  the	  many	   Syrians	   caught	   in	   the	  middle,	   especially	   the	   upper	   and	  middle	   classes,	   the	  regime’s	  claim	  to	  defend	  order	  against	  the	  disruption	  unleashed	  by	  the	  Uprising	  caused	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  them	  to	  acquiesce	  in	  it	  as	  the	  lesser	  of	  two	  evils;	  this	  was	  all	  the	  more	  the	  case	  once	  radical	  Islamists,	  and	  especially	  al-­‐Qaida-­‐linked	  jihadists,	  assumed	  a	  high	  profile	  within	  the	  opposition	  and	  as	  the	  opposition	  itself	  fragmented	  into	  warring	  camps.	  	  	   In	   summary,	   it	   is	   apparent	   is	   that	   there	   were	   enough	   grievances	   to	   fuel	   an	  uprising	   in	   Syria	   but	   only	   among	   a	   plurality	   of	   the	   population,	   with	   a	   significant	  minority	  adhering	  to	  the	  regime	  as	  a	  better	  alternative	  than	  civil	  war,	  and	  the	  majority	  on	  the	  sidelines.	  This	  helps	  explain	  the	  regime’s	  ability	  to	  sustain	  its	  cohesion	  and	  retain	  control	  of	  the	  main	  cities,	  Damascus	  and	  Aleppo	  (until	  part	  of	  the	  latter	  fell	  to	  jihadist	  incursions).12	  	  This	  scenario	  is	  quite	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  paradigm	  in	  which	   the	   regime’s	   violence	   progressively	   isolates	   it	   from	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	  population,	  precipitating	  its	  collapse	  and	  it	  distinguishes	  Syria	  from	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  where	   the	   incumbent	   presidents	   proved	   unable	   to	   rally	   sufficient	   support	   to	   survive.	  This	   points	   to	   the	   reality,	   ignored	   by	   the	   resistance	   paradigm,	   that	   differences	   in	   the	  social	  structure	  of	  societies	  and	  composition	  of	  regimes	  makes	  for	  important	  variations	  in	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  to	  revolt.	  In	  homogeneous	  societies	  such	  as	  Egypt	   and	  Tunisia	  mass	   anti-­‐regime	  mobilization	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  much	  more	   thorough	  and	  decisive	   than	   in	   communally	  divided	  ones	   like	   Syria;	   and	  where	   the	  presidency’s	  clientalist	   and	   political	   ties	   to	   the	   military	   are	   stronger	   and	   the	   army’s	   institutional	  autonomy	  lesser,	  the	  military	  is	  far	  less	  likely	  to	  jettison	  presidents	  to	  save	  itself.	  	  	  
From	  the	  “Security	  Solution”	  to	  the	  “Security	  Dilemma”	  Throughout	   2011	   and	   into	   2012,	   the	   numbers	   of	   anti-­‐regime	   demonstrators	   ran	   into	  the	  tens	  of	  thousands	  and	  major	  protests	  took	  place	  without	  respite	   in	  virtually	  every	  Syrian	   town	   and	   city	   except	   Damascus	   and	   Aleppo,	   such	   that,	   even	   though	   unarmed,	  they	   posed	   a	   serious	   threat	   to	   the	   regime’s	   survival.	   The	   regime’s	   forces,	   lacking	  training	  and	  experience	   in	  crowd	  or	  riot	  control,	  continued	  to	  respond	  with	  excessive	  violence,	  multiplying	  its	  enemies	  and	  making	  funerals	  occasions	  for	  more	  confrontation.	  	  However,	   the	   opposition	   was	   complicit	   with	   the	   regime	   in	   the	   deterioration	   into	  violence.	  Indeed,	  both	  sides	  opted	  consistently	  to	  escalate	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  and	  thus,	  further	  polarized	  society,	  resulting,	  however,	  in	  stalemates	  which	  both	  then	  thought	  to	  overcome	  through	  further	  escalation.	  	  	   	  The	  regime,	  despite	  the	  high	  risks,	  deliberately	  sought	  to	  rally	  the	  solidarity	  of	  its	   minority	   base,	   intertwined	   with	   the	   security	   forces,	   by	   sectarianizing	   the	   issue,	  accusing	   the	   opposition	   of	   Islamic	   terrorism,	   framing	   the	   issue	   as	   a	   choice	   between	  stability	  and	  social	  peace	  and	  jihadi	  violence	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  minorities,	  who	  could	  expect	   retribution	   if	   the	   regime	   fell.	   The	   opposition	   initially	   sought	   to	   win	   over	   the	  minorities	   with	   a	   rhetoric	   of	   civic	   inclusion;	   however,	   as	   democracy	   activists	   either	  exited	  Syria	  or	  fell	  back	  on	  religious	  zeal	  in	  a	  time	  of	  high	  insecurity,	  the	  balance	  shifted	  to	   Islamist	   hardliners,	   empowered	   by	  money	   and	   guns	   from	   the	  Gulf.	   The	   opposition	  also	  had	  an	  incentive	  to	  sectarianize	  the	  conflict	  since	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  became	  framed	  in	  
                                                
12 Hassan Abbas, ‘The Dynamics of the Uprising in Syria,’ Arab Reform Brief, 51, October, 2011, p 9. 
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sectarian	   terms	   a	   regime	   of	   minorities	   would	   be	   vulnerable	   to	   a	   large	   demographic	  imbalance	  (70%)	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Sunnis	  majority	  from	  whom	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  protestors	  were	  drawn.13	  	  	   Another	  major	  dimension	  in	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  conflict	  was	  battle	  for	  cities	  in	  which	   the	   opposition	   sought	   to	   escape	   from	   confinement	   in	   the	   peripheries.	   The	  opposition	   realized	   it	   could	   not	   win	   without	   breaking	   the	   alignment	   between	   the	  regime,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  bourgeoisie	  and	  middle	  class,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  the	  two	  main	  cities,	  Damascus	  and	  Aleppo,	  where	  many	  valued	  stability	  and	  had	  much	   to	  lose	  economically	  from	  the	  disorder	  and	  which	  therefore	  remained	  immune	  in	  the	  first	  year	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Uprising.	  At	  first	  the	  opposition	  thought	  that	  the	  turmoil	  and	  Western	  sanctions	  would	  paralyze	  the	  economy	  enough	  to	  cause	  the	  business	  elites	  to	  desert	   the	   regime,	   while	   sanctions	   would	   sap	   the	   regime’s	   revenue	   base,	   hence	   its	  ability	  to	  pay	  salaries	  and	  sustain	  the	  loyalties	  of	  the	  state	  administration.	  However,	  an	  economic	  collapse	  did	  not	  take	  place,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  the	  regime	  proved	  capable	  of	  perpetuating	  itself	  financially.	  	  	   Ultimately,	   therefore,	   to	   turn	   the	   main	   cities	   against	   the	   regime,	   parts	   of	   the	  opposition	   reverted	   to	   the	   strategy	   of	   showing	   that	   the	   regime	   could	   not	   guarantee	  stability.	   It	   therefore	   turned	   to	   bombings	   and	   armed	   infiltrations	   into	   urban	  neighbourhoods	   and	   suburbs;	   the	   regime,	   in	   turn,	   used	   heavy	   weapons	   against	  suburban	   neighbourhoods	   harbouring	   the	   insurgents	   to	   send	   the	   message	   to	  populations	  that	  such	  armed	  groups	  should	  not	  be	  tolerated	  in	  their	  midst.	  Homs,	  which	  slipped	   almost	   entirely	   under	   opposition	   control,	   became	   a	   particular	   victim	   of	   this	  dynamic	   in	   which	   regime	   violence	   against	   urban	   neighbourhoods	   was	   particularly	  bloody.	  A	   further	  watershed	   in	   intensification	  of	   the	  conflict	  was	   its	   spread	   to	  Aleppo	  where	   the	   opposition	   escalated	   the	   fight,	   infiltrating	   and	   seizing	   half	   of	   the	   city,	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   the	   upper	   and	   middle	   classes	   would	   not	   remain	   immune	   to	   the	  violence;	   in	   summer	   2012	   battles	   in	   Aleppo	   drew	   increasing	   numbers	   of	   jihadist	  fighters.	  The	  regime	  resorted	  to	  air	  and	  artillery	  attacks	  on	  urban	  built	  up	  areas.	  There	  followed	   the	   destruction	   of	   large	   parts	   of	   Syrian’s	   industrial	   base	   and	   looting	   on	   a	  massive	  scale	  as	  whole	  factories	  were	  dismantled	  and	  exported	  to	  Turkey.	  	  	   Militarization	  of	  the	  conflict	  was	  perhaps	  inevitable.	  It	  was	  the	  regime	  that	  chose	  fatefully	  to	  further	  escalate	  its	  security	  solution—from	  use	  of	  the	  police	  and	  militias—to	  a	  military	  solution	  in	  which	  heavy	  weapons	  and	  aircraft	  were	  used	  in	  urban	  areas.	  The	  move	  toward	  a	  military	  solution	  appears	  partly	  to	  have	  been	  a	  response	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  over	   a	   hundred	   regime	   solders	   and	   police	   in	   the	   Islamist	   stronghold	   of	   Jisr	   ash-­‐Shaghour	  in	  June	  2011	  and	  also	  a	  bid	  to	  prevent	  establishment	  of	  “liberated	  areas”	  that	  would	   facilitate	  Western	   intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  opposition,	  as	  had	  happened	   in	  Libya.	  As	  the	  regime	  found	  it	  impossible	  to	  contain	  the	  protests	  at	  one	  level	  of	  violence,	  it	   increased	   the	   level	   thereby	   killing	   many	   innocents	   and	   peaceful	   protestors	   and,	  eventually,	   destroying	   entire	   neighbourhoods.	   The	   regime’s	   escalation	   generated	   a	  desire	  for	  revenge	  and	  legitimizing	  the	  notion	  of	  armed	  self-­‐defense	  among	  the	  mostly	  Sunni	   opposition.	   Eventually,	   perhaps	   10,000	   defectors	   from	   a	   200,000-­‐man	   Syrian	  army	   formed	   the	   core	   of	   armed	   resistance	   to	   the	   government,	   the	   Free	   Syrian	  Army,	  while	  many	  of	   the	  protestors	   joined	   armed	   Islamist	   groups,	  which	   could	   soon	  deploy	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  fighters.	  The	  regime	  may	  have	  welcomed	  a	  militarized	  opposition	  as	   an	   enemy	   easier	   to	   deal	   with	   than	   mass	   civil	   protesters.	   In	   abandoning	   peaceful	  protest,	   the	   opposition	   opened	   the	   door	   for	   the	   regime	   to	   move	   from	   the	   security	  
                                                13	  Of	  course,	  many	  Sunnis	  were	  secular,	  hence	  would	  not	  normally	  mobilize	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Sunni	  identity	  and	  this	  figure	  also	  include	  the	  Kurds	  (7-­‐10%)	  whose	  separate	  ethnic	  identity	  overrode	  their	  Sunnism.	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solution	   to	   the	   military	   solution.	   Red	   lines	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	   particular	   weapons	  systems	   were	   overstepped	   one	   by	   one,	   with	   the	   much	   better	   armed	   regime	   usually	  leading	  the	  way:	  a	  spiral	  of	  violence	  led	  from	  bullets	  to	  bombs,	  tanks	  and	  fighter	  planes	  and,	  as	  the	  conflict	  entered	  its	  third	  year,	  also	  chemical	  weapons,	  with	  both	  conflicting	  parties	  perpetrated	  violations	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  	   As	  order	  broke	  down,	  the	  “security	  dilemma”	  kicked	  in	  and	  each	  side	  resorted	  to	  defensive	  tactics	  that	  made	  both	  more	  insecure,	  while	  trapping	  much	  of	  the	  population	  in	   the	   middle.	   Hatreds	   of	   the	   “other”	   spread	   the	   conviction	   on	   both	   sides	   that	   no	  political	  solution	  was	  possible,	  even	  once	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  neither	  could	  defeat	  the	  other.	  As	  the	  conflict	  morphed	  into	  semi-­‐sectarian	  civil	  war,	  whole	  communities	  became	  entrapped	   in	   the	   “security	   dilemma,”	   seeing	   the	   “other”	   as	   enemies.	   Mass	   flows	   of	  refugees	  emptied	  the	  country	  of	  many	  of	  those	  caught	  in	  between	  and	  also	  of	  many	  of	  the	  secular	  middle	  class	  peaceful	  protestors,	  leaving	  the	  field	  to	  the	  radical	  Islamists.	  	  	   	  Jihadists	   and	   al-­‐Qaida	   arrived	   on	   the	   scene	   since	   they	   saw	   a	   failing	   state	   as	   a	  perfect	   arena	   to	   recover	   the	  momentum	   they	   had	   lost	  when	   the	  Arab	   Spring	  made	   it	  appear	   that	   non-­‐violent	   protest	   could	   produce	   democratic	   transitions.	   Most	   of	   these	  groups	  were	   under	   no	   unified	   command	   and	   not	   accountable	   to	   any	   civilian	   political	  body.	   Instead,	   they	  maintained	  diverse	   and	  opaque	   connections	   to	  domestic	   or,	  more	  often,	  foreign	  bodies	  and	  thus	  contributed	  to	  the	  internationalization	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  	   The	  armed	  opposition’s	  capacity	   to	  deny	  the	  regime	  control	   in	  many	  areas	  and	  the	   army’s	   lack	   of	   sufficient	   reliable	   manpower	   to	   repress	   what	   became	   widespread	  armed	  insurgency,	   led	  the	  regime	  to	  withdraw	  into	  its	  strategic	  southern	  and	  western	  heartlands;	   this	   left	   much	   of	   rural	   northern	   and	   eastern	   Syria	   out	   of	   government	  control,	  a	  scenario	  somewhat	  similar	  to	  Libya	  but	  different	  from	  Egypt	  where	  the	  army	  retained	  territorial	  control	  (except	   in	   the	  Sinai).	  Three	  years	  after	   the	  Uprising	  began,	  the	  country	  had	  become	  divided	  between	  regime	  and	  opposition	  controlled	  regions,	  an	  egregious	  example	  of	  a	  failed	  state.	  	   	  	  
The	  External	  Factor	  Drives	  Internal	  War	  From	  the	  outset,	  the	  possibility	  of	  external	  military	  intervention	  shaped	  both	  opposition	  and	   regime	   strategies.	   Anti-­‐regime	   activists,	   including	   Syrian	   expatriates	   who	   were	  instrumental	   in	   initiating	   and	   internationalizing	   the	   Uprising,	   understood	   that	   they	  could	   not	   succeed	   without	   external	   intervention	   to	   restrain	   the	   regime’s	   repressive	  options.	  External	  activists	   told	   those	  on	   the	  ground,	  pointing	   to	   the	  Libya	  no-­‐fly	  zone,	  that	  “the	  international	  community	  won’t	  sit	  and	  watch	  you	  be	  killed.”	  They	  claimed	  that	  another	  Hama	  was	  not	   possible	   because	   “Everything	   is	   being	   filmed	  on	  YouTube	   and	  there’s	  a	  lot	  of	  international	  attention	  on	  the	  Middle	  East”14	  There	  were	  reports	  that	  the	  opposition,	   particularly	   external	   internet	   activists,	   systematically	   exaggerated	  bloodshed	  and	  found	  willing	  partners	  in	  the	  Western	  press	  and	  particularly	  in	  the	  Gulf-­‐owned	  Pan-­‐Arab	  media	  whose	  patrons	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  remove	  an	  Iranian	  ally.15	  	  	   The	   regime	   for	   its	   part,	   having	   survived	   several	   decades	   of	   international	  isolation	   orchestrated	  by	   the	  US,	   but	   also	   involving	  Europe,	   had	   always	   seen	   itself	   as	  besieged	   by	   foreign	   enemies;	   the	   role	   played	   by	   external	   exiles	   and	   internet	   activists	  abroad,	  often	  Western	   funded,	   in	  provoking	  or	  escalating	   the	  Uprising	  was	   congruent	  
                                                14	  Kate	  Seelye,	  ‘Syria	  Unrest	  “Cannot	  Be	  Contained”’,	  The	  Daily	  Beast,	  28	  Mar.	  2011,	  www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/28/syria-­‐unrest-­‐cannot-­‐be-­‐contained-­‐dissidents-­‐say.html.	  15	  Angela	  Joya,	  ‘Syria	  and	  the	  Arab	  Spring:	  The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  Conflict	  and	  the	  Role	  of	  Domestic	  External	  and	  Factors’,	  Ortadoğu	  Etütleri,	  4,	  no.	  1	  (July	  2012),	  40–3.	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with	   its	   perceptions	   of	   conspiracy.	   It	   tarnished	   the	   indigenous	   opposition	   with	   the	  suspicion	   of	   treasonous	   dealings	   with	   foreign	   enemies,	   justifying	   the	   resort	   to	  repressive	   violence.	   It	   could	   be	   said	   to	   have	   been	   a	   major	   mistake	   of	   opposition	  activists,	  deluded	  by	  Western	  discourse	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention	  and	  international	  human	   rights,	   to	   solicit	   support	   from	  external	   powers	   in	   a	   region	  where	   the	   struggle	  against	  “Western	  imperialism”	  remains	  so	  salient.	  	  	   The	  West	  did	  become	  involved	  but,	  in	  so	  doing,	  it	  made	  a	  major	  contribution	  to	  the	   further	  deterioration	  of	   the	  situation.	   It	  slapped	  sanctions	  on	  the	  regime	  meant	  to	  deprive	  it	  of	  oil	  revenue,	  which	  was	  indeed,	  a	  key	  step	  in	  the	  debilitation	  of	  the	  state	  and	  of	   its	  capacity	  to	  provide	  basic	  services	  to	  the	  population,	  but	  not	  of	  the	  regime,	  which	  found	   alternative	   informal	   sources	   of	   revenue;	   this	  was	   yet	   another	   in	   a	   long	   line	   of	  examples	   that	   prove	   how	   blunt	   and	   untargeted	   such	   sanctions	   always	   are.	   The	  West	  also	   moved	   to	   diplomatically	   isolate	   and	   demonize	   the	   regime,	   withdrawing	   its	  ambassadors,	   and	   with	  Western	   politicians	   clamouring	   for	   military	   intervention	   and	  raising	   the	   spectre	   of	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court;	   at	   a	   certain	   point,	   the	   regime	  inner	   core	   realized	   that	   there	  was	   no	  way	   back	   for	   them	   and	   that	   they	   had	   to	   hand	  together	   or	   hang	   separately	   and	   do	   whatever	   was	   necessary	   to	   survive,	   including	  escalating	  from	  the	  security	  to	  a	  military	  solution.	  Yet	  the	  threats	  against	  the	  regime	  by	  the	  West,	  while	  encouraging	  protestors,	  proved,	  as	  so	  often,	  to	  be	  hollow	  and	  hence	  to	  contribute	   to	  making	  a	  bad	   situation	  worse.	  The	   regime	   tried	   to	   calibrate	   its	  violence	  within	   limits	   that	  would	  not	   trigger	  an	   international	  bandwagon	   toward	   intervention,	  although	  over	  time	  this	  bar	  was	  steadily	  raised.	  But	  not	  dependent,	  as	  the	  Egyptian	  and	  Tunisian	  regimes	  were	  on	  the	  West,	  the	  regime	  had	  far	  less	  need	  to	  restrain	  its	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  protestors.	  In	  mid-­‐2011	  it	  also	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  quickly	  smash	  resistance	  so	   as	   not	   to	   lose	   control	   of	   territory	   that	   could	   be	   used	   to	   stage	   intervention	   as	   had	  happened	  in	  Libya;	  the	  Libyan	  precedent	  thus	  helped	  precipitate	  a	  transition	  from	  the	  “security	  solution”	  to	  the	  “military	  solution.”	  	  
	   While	  the	  uprising	  started	  indigenous,	  it	  was	  much	  intensified	  by	  regional	  forces,	  which	   turned	   Syria	   into	   a	   regional	   battleground	   among	   those	   who	   believed	   that	   the	  outcome	  in	  Syria	  would	  shift	  the	  wider	  power	  balance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Qatar	  used	  Al-­‐Jazeera	  to	  amplify	  the	  uprising	  from	  the	  outset,	  while	  the	  Saudis	  funnelled	  money	  and	  arms	   to	   anti-­‐regime	   tribes.	   In	  November	  2011,	  Qatar	   and	   Saudi	  Arabia	   prompted	   the	  Arab	  League	   into	  unprecedented	  moves	   to	   isolate	  Syria,	   aimed,	   together	  with	  parallel	  European	   sanctions,	   at	   drying	   up	   the	   regime’s	   access	   to	   economic	   resources	   and	  breaking	   its	   coalition	   with	   the	   business	   class.	   An	   anti-­‐Asad	   coalition,	   led	   by	   France,	  Saudi	   Arabia,	   Qatar,	   and	   Turkey,	   with	   the	   US	   in	   the	   background,	   and	   with	   the	  collaboration	  of	  lesser	  actors	  such	  as	  the	  Hariri	  faction	  in	  Lebanon	  and	  the	  new	  Libyan	  regime,	   began	   financing,	   training,	   arming	   and	   infiltrating	   insurgents	   into	   the	   country,	  escalating	   the	  militarization	  of	   the	  conflict.	  The	  safe	  haven	  provided	  by	  Turkey	   to	   the	  armed	  opposition	  particularly	  enabled	  it	  to	  “liberate”	  vast	  areas	  bordering	  Turkey	  from	  regime	   control.	   Somewhat	   later,	   trans-­‐national	   jihadists	   flowed	   into	   the	   country,	  acquiring	  a	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  east	  as	  this	  area	  slipped	  out	  of	  government	  control.	  	  	   The	  Asad	  regime’s	  ability	  to	  slip	  out	  of	  this	  tightening	  stranglehold	  depended	  on	  its	  links	  to	  Hezbollah	  in	  the	  west	  and,	  in	  the	  east,	  to	  Iran	  and	  Iraq.	  It	  increasingly	  relied	  on	  Iran,	  whose	  Revolutionary	  Guard	  assisted	  it	  with	  electronic	  warfare	  and	  which	  urged	  Iraq	  to	  provide	  Syria	  with	  cheap	  oil	  and	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Asad	  coalition	  and	  later	  on	  Hizbollah	  fighters	  whose	  entry	  into	  the	  fray	  tipped	  the	  balance	  toward	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  western	  areas	  bordering	  Lebanon.	  Meanwhile	  Russia	  and	  China,	  antagonized	  by	  the	  West’s	  use	  of	  a	  UN	  humanitarian	  resolution	  to	  promote	  regime	  change	  at	  their	  expense	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in	  Libya,	  protected	  Asad	  from	  a	  similar	  scenario.	  	   These	   external	   involvements,	   each	   blocking	   the	   other,	   contributed	   to	   the	  stalemating	  of	   the	  conflict:	  Turkish,	  Saudi	  and	  Qatari	  support	   for	  the	  opposition	  being	  offset	   by	   Iranian,	   Hizbollah	   and	   Iraqi	   support	   for	   the	   regime;	   and	   internationally,	  American	  and	  European	  support	   for	   the	  Uprising	  being	  offset	  by	  Russian	  and	  Chinese	  support	  for	  the	  regime.	  The	  resources	  external	  powers	  provided	  to	  their	  Syrian	  proxies	  was	  also	  crucial	  in	  keeping	  the	  conflict	  going.	  	  	   	  	  
Failed	  State,	  War	  Economy	  Once	   the	   Syrian	   state	   failed,	   the	   conflict	   came	   to	   betray	   symptoms	   of	   Mary	   Kaldor’s	  “New	  Wars.”16	  In	  her	  scenario,	  state	  weakening,	  itself	  linked	  ultimately	  to	  globalization,	  empowers	   transnational	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   When	   order	   breaks	   down,	   the	   security	  dilemma	  kicks	  in	  as	  warring	  sides	  engage	  in	  identity	  wars	  and	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  and	  the	  distinction	   between	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants	   is	   blurred.	  Warlordism	   fills	   the	  security	   gap;	   refugee	   flows,	   funding	   by	   Diasporas,	   and	   transnational	   arms	   trafficking	  embed	   the	   conflict	   in	  wider	   regional	   struggles	   that	  make	   it	   all	   the	   harder	   to	   resolve.	  Since	  neither	  regime	  or	  opposition	  had	  by	  2014	  any	  prospect	  of	  victory	  over	  the	  other,	  they	  ought	  potentially	   to	  have	  been	  close	   to	   the	   “hurting”	   stalemate	   that	  would	  allow	  both	  sides	  to	  be	  ready	  to	  settle	  for	  less	  than	  victory	  and	  to	  try	  to	  minimize	  their	  losses,	  which	  continued	  on	  all	  sides,	  rather	  than	  maximize	  their	  gains.	  However,	  this	  dynamic	  was	   short-­‐circuited	   by	   the	   war	   economy	   that	   was	   generated	   by	   outside	   funding	   and	  arms:	   it	   helped	   the	   regime	   to	   continue	   fighting,	   attracted	   foreign	   fighters	   to	   the	  opposition	  and	  helped	  recruit	  Syrians,	  who	  had	  lost	  their	  livelihood,	  to	  militant	  groups,	  with	  more	  attracted	  to	  the	  best-­‐funded,	  usually	  radical	  or	  at	  least	  Islamist	  factions.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  Syria:	  failed	  transition	  The	  Syrian	  Uprising	  began	  with	  massive	  protests	  that	  the	  Asad	  regime	  could	  not	  quickly	  suppress	   and	   which	   put	   it	   very	   much	   on	   the	   defensive.	   Yet	   it	   did	   not	   stimulate	   a	  transition	   to	  a	  more	  politically	   inclusive	  political	  order	  and	   led	   instead	   to	  civil	  war.	  A	  pacted	  transition	  was	  frustrated	  by	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  soft-­‐liners	  on	  both	  sides.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   President’s	   choice	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   demonstrations	   with	   a	  “security	   solution”	   rather	   than	  democratic	   reforms	  mattered:	   in	   standing	  with	   regime	  hardliners,	  he	  empowered	  the	  hardliners	  in	  the	  opposition	  as	  well.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  opposition,	  with	   exaggerated	   confidence	   in	   the	   efficacy	  of	  mass	  protest	   (owing	   to	  Western	  discourse	  as	  well	  as	  events	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt)	  bore	  some	  responsibility	  for	  this	   failure	  as	   its	   increasingly	  maximalist	  demands	  made	  an	   insider-­‐outsider	  coalition	  unlikely.	  	   Nor	  could	  the	  opposition	  mount	  sufficient	  civil	  disorder	  to	  force	  the	  departure	  of	  the	   president	   and	   his	   core	   supporters.	   The	   protests	   began	   in	   the	   peripheries,	   rather	  than	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   power,	   where	   the	   regime	   had	   co-­‐opted	   key	   social	   forces	   and	  retained	  sufficient	  support	  to	  block	  a	  periphery	  move	  on	  the	  centre.	  There	  were	  enough	  grievances	  to	  fuel	  an	  uprising	  but	  only	  among	  a	  plurality	  of	  the	  population,	  with	  others	  adhering	   to	   the	   regime	  as	   a	  better	   alternative	   than	   civil	  war,	   and	   the	  majority	  on	   the	  side-­‐lines.	  The	  regime	  framed	  the	  protests	  as	  radical	  Islamic	  terrorism	  in	  order	  to	  rally	  the	   support	   of	   secular	   middle	   class,	   the	   minorities,	   and,	   in	   particular,	   its	   Alawi	  
                                                
16 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, Oxford: Polity Press, 1999. 	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constituency,	   which	   dominated	   the	   security	   forces.	   Clearly,	   authoritarian	   regimes	  constructed	  in	  fragmented	  societies	  around	  a	  cohesive	  communal	  and	  armed	  core	  may	  be	   far	   less	   susceptible	   to	   non-­‐violent	   resistance	   regardless	   of	   its	   magnitude	   and	  duration.	   The	   security	   forces	   did	   not	   generally	   split	   and	  while	   there	  were	   defections,	  notably	   among	   Sunni	   officers,	   rather	   than	   leading	   to	   regime	   collapse	   this	   merely	  militarized	  the	  conflict,	  and,	  as	  the	  army	  proved	  unable	  to	  retain	  full	  territorial	  control,	  precipitated	  the	  division	  of	  the	  country	  into	  mutually	  exclusive	  and	  contested	  zones.	  	  	   There	  were	  several	  watersheds	  in	  the	  descent	  into	  armed	  civil	  war	  when	  agency	  could	  have	  mattered	  and	  the	  conflict	  stopped.	  However,	  each	  side	  sought	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	   by	   escalating	   the	   conflict.	   The	   opposition	   sought	   to	   de-­‐stabilize	   the	   state	  through	  massive	  civil	  unrest,	  to	  undermine	  the	  economy	  and	  to	  spread	  disorder	  to	  the	  cities	  and	  break	  the	  regime	  alliance	  with	  business.	  To	  work,	  this	  required	  that	  external	  constraints	  deter	  full-­‐scale	  regime	  repression	  –	  or	  that	  the	  latter	  would	  provoke	  outside	  intervention.	   Far	   from	   being	   deterred,	   the	   opposition’s	   call	   for	   external	   intervention	  only	   encouraged	   the	   regime	   to	  move	   toward	   a	   “military	   solution”	   that	   did	   not	   spare	  civilians	   or	   shrink	   from	   use	   of	   heavy	   weapons	   against	   urban	   neighbourhoods,	   thus	  precipitated	  the	  overall	  militarization	  of	  the	  uprising.	  	   The	   outcome,	   thus,	   was	   neither	   revolution	   nor	   effective	   repression,	   but	  stalemate	  and	  a	  failed	  state,	  with	  the	  security	  dilemma,	  external	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  warring	  sides	  and	  the	  war	  economy	  giving	  civil	  war	  an	  extended	  shelf	  life.	  One	  of	  the	   lessons	   of	   this	   story	   is	   the	   fragility	   of	   fragmented	   states	   like	   Syria:	   it	   is	   relatively	  easy	  to	  de-­‐stabilize	  them,	  but	  much	  harder	  to	  put	  the	  pieces	  back	  together.	  	  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
